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Environmental concernIn this paper we ﬁrst propose a conceptual framework for evaluating 3PL (third-party logistics) utilization in
SCM (supply chain management), in which it is assumed that shippers may enjoy advantages derived from
four contributory sources of 3PL specialization: scale, know-how, searching ability, and IT skills. It is also
supposed that shippers may particularly beneﬁt from 3PL when facing uncertain business environments. We
also apply principal–agent relationships to shippers and 3PL providers. Further, we see enhancing “agency
efﬁciency” as important to obtaining the beneﬁts of 3PL utilization. We also look at the role of 3PL provider
selection, the “hold-up” problem under incomplete contracts, and asset ownership. After that we brieﬂy
discuss the utilization of 3PL and environmental concerns. These are the main points that we consider related
to 3PL utilization. The main contribution of this study is to identify discussion points from models and
theories, such as contract theory, that relate to the utilization of 3PL in SCM.ssociation of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. Published by Efety Sciences. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.© 2011 International Association of Trafﬁc and Sa1. Introduction
Recently the number of 3PL (third-party logistics) providers has
increased rapidly in Japan as well as in other countries. 3PL providers
are contracted to supply integrated logistics services and are closely
related to SCM (supply chain management). In this paper we consider
the rationale for utilizing 3PL in the supply chain. Efﬁcient utilization
of 3PL is expected to bring beneﬁts such as reducing total costs.
However, there seem to be certain conditions for utilizing 3PL
efﬁciently. If so, what points should be considered? What are the
necessary conditions for making efﬁcient use of 3PL? It would be
difﬁcult in this paper to cover all of the various market and business
forms of 3PL. Our purpose, therefore, is to identify discussion points
related to the utilization of 3PL. We look, in particular, at features of
3PL utilization from an economic perspective, focusing on economic
aspects of 3PL, the selection of 3PL providers, the problem of
incomplete contracts, and asset ownership from the shipper's
perspective. These points stem from arguments made in recent
economic theories. The main contribution of this study is to identify
discussion points where recent economic theories can be applied to
the utilization of 3PL in SCM. Although we ﬁnd many papers
concerning 3PL and SCM, few seem to address such issues.
The paper is organized as follows. We provide an overview of 3PL
in Section 2, then conﬁrm the function of 3PL within supply chain
management in Section 3. In Section 4, we focus on principal–agentrelationships, then point out the role of 3PL provider selection in
Section 5. In addition, we look at recent arguments concerning
contract theory before trying to relate this theory to 3PL utilization in
Sections 6 and 7. After that, we examine environmental concerns
related to utilization of 3PL in Section 8. Finally, we conclude in
Section 9.2. Overview of 3PL
To conﬁrm the concepts of SCM and 3PL, we ﬁrst explain them by
drawing on papers by Nemoto and Tezuka [1] and Nemoto, Tezuka
and Futamura [2]. The supply chain consists of a set of processes
associated with the ﬂow of goods, information, and money among
ﬁrms, from the raw materials supply stage through the production
and consumption stage and ﬁnally to the recycling stage. SCM is a tool
for optimizing the supply chain through integrated management.
Since SCM involves inter-ﬁrm activities, it encompasses functions
such as raw materials supply, production management, transporta-
tion, inventory management, information system management, order
processing, material handling, and customer management.
Furthermore, international SCM also includes procedures related to
customs clearance. One of the main features of SCM is that vertical
process integration from suppliers through customers can beperformed
through strategic inter-ﬁrm alliances. A well-designed SCM yields
positive net value by creating beneﬁts, reducing costs, and improving
ﬁnancial viability (such as proﬁtability.) That such outcomes can be
obtained without mergers (integrating all processes within one ﬁrm)
may reduce the transaction cost of integration.lsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2 Marasco [7] used a framework to clarify much of the literature related to 3PL. Such
literature is easily accessible.
3 Nemoto and Tezuka [1] consider the relationship between SCM and 3PL in detail.
4 Domberger [8] comments on the relationship between outsourcing and specializa-
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ﬂow of goods. Logistics optimization, therefore, cannot be achieved
only from the viewpoint of one ﬁrm; it requires total optimization of
the ﬂow of goods across all ﬁrms in the supply chain.
Firms that possess logistics know-how in coordinating economic
resources may have opportunities to provide advice. Such logistics
coordinators, also called third-party logistics (3PL) providers, have
been gaining attention. 3PL is a type of industry in which the shipper's
logistics activities can be outsourced. It is common 3PL practice not to
outsource discrete logistics activities individually but rather to
outsource multiple activities from the ﬁrm's strategic point of view.
3PL providers today have the following characteristics:
1. Integrated (or multi-modal) logistics service providers
2. Contract-based service providers
3. Consulting service providers
The advantages of using 3PL result from economies of scale (merits
from large truck ﬂeets, warehouses, etc.) and economies of scope that
encourage ﬁrms to increase net value by reducing costs. The effects of
these economies vary depending on whether the 3PL provider is an
“asset-type” or “non-asset type” provider. The former owns logistics-
related assets such as truck ﬂeets or warehouses while the latter does
not. In the Japanese context, therefore, non-asset type 3PL providers
correspond to forwarders, generalized trading ﬁrms, or consultant
ﬁrms.
Competent 3PL providers are skilled at coordination, enabling
them to search out reliable partners or sub-contractors and efﬁciently
manage the inter-ﬁrm ﬂow of goods. Such abilities can be developed
through experience as a 3PL. Laterwewill consider the sources of such
experience and specialization.
At the same time, by outsourcing logistics activities ﬁrms are able
to save on capital investment and reduce ﬁnancial risk. Investment in
logistics assets such as physical distribution centers or information
networks usually requires large lump sum costs that involve ﬁnancial
risk. 3PL providers can spread their risk by outsourcing to sub-
contractors.
Regarding the role of supply chain coordinators, the concepts of
4PL (fourth-party logistics) and LLP (lean logistics provider) have also
recently been introduced. According to Vitasek [3], they differ from
3PL as follows:
1. A 4PL organization is often a separate entity established as a joint
venture or long-term contract between a primary client and one or
more partners.
2. A 4PL organization acts as a single interface between the client and
multiple logistics service providers.
3. All aspects, ideally, of the client's supply chain are managed by the
4PL organization.
4. It is possible for a major 3PL logistics provider to form a 4PL
organization within its existing structure.
In other examples, Craig [4] deﬁnes 4PL as a business process
outsourcing provider while Mukhopadhyay and Setaptra [5] regard
4PL as a supply chain integrator. It is, however, sometimes difﬁcult to
differentiate between 3PL and 4PL as their deﬁnitions sometimes
overlap in terms of their functions. Further, in the Japanese context,
the concept of 4PL seems to be regarded as a kind of non-asset type
3PL provider.1 In the following, therefore, we utilize the term 3PL/4PL
where it seems necessary.
3. The functions of 3PL in supply chains
3PL has attracted considerable research attention. Marasco [7]
conducted a comprehensive review of 3PL using a content analysis1 Lie [6] pointed out that Toyota Motors integrated its 3PL providers and established
a new company as a 4PL provider in 2007.framework (Fig. 1). Among themany issues about 3PL raised in Fig. 1,2
we focus on the following3: constructing SCM and the conditions
under which 3PL providers are well-utilized by shippers. To examine
this problem, for the present, we make two assumptions. First, a
shipper constructs a supply chain. Second, the shipper outsources
integrated logistics activities in their supply chains to 3PL providers.
Under these circumstances, we focus on 3PL provider specializa-
tion. 3PL providers provide shippers with speciﬁc logistics activities in
an integrated chain. Such effects of specialization might have a
number of sources.
First, specialized 3PL providers have the advantage of their own
experience. (The accumulation of experience can be described as the
accumulation of know-how.) Experienced 3PL providers engage in
logistics activities more cost-efﬁciently.4
A representative example of know-how is IT-related activity. IT-
related activities such as database management or data processing in
inventory or warehousing play a major role in the provision of
logistics services. IT-related activity requires specialized skills and
offers easy differentiation from other providers.
Another example is the recent utilization by many Japanese ﬁrms
of 3PL providers when entering new foreign markets such as ASEAN.
Many Japanese ﬁrms require logistics management experience in
these markets because they lack know-how; 3PL providers are
frequency utilized in such international contexts.
The know-how of experienced 3PL providers might make for more
efﬁcient logistics activity that enhances supply chain performance.
Logistics performance may inﬂuence overall supply chain perfor-
mance. Therefore, shippers may outsource logistics activity to 3PL
providers when entering foreign market and making supply chains.
These advantages of experienced 3PL providers come from a
learning effect: the more services they provide, the less they cost.
Shippers that utilize 3PL providers enjoy such effects. If the experience
of 3PL providers can be imitated by others, however, shippers will see
little effect over the long run from utilizing 3PL providers. When
constructing international supply chains, however, such imitation
seems to pose many difﬁculties.
A second effect of specialization is related not to producing
activities but to searching and information advantages.5 We next
focus on 3PL searching ability. 3PL providers may not provide all
logistics services by themselves but rather outsource to subcontrac-
tors. That is, competent 3PL providers are highly skilled at coordina-
tion, enabling them to search out reliable partners and subcontractors
to efﬁciently manage the inter-ﬁrm ﬂow of goods.
With regard to informational advantages, 3PL providers must not
only search out sub-contractors but sometimes also partners and
customers. For example, as Nemoto, Tezuka and Futamura [2] have
observed, Japanese generalized trade ﬁrms or forwarders acting as
non-asset type 3PL providers have constructed efﬁcient supply chain
logistics schemes when entering the Chinese logistics market. They
did so by selecting better Chinese domestic carriers. In this case, the
high searching ability of 3PL providers enabled better selection of
China domestic providers to achieve a more proﬁtable (more cost
efﬁcient) outcome. Such proﬁts could be shared so shippers also
gained. High searching ability depends on 3PL provider information
advantages. In undertaking such activity, 3PL providers can be seen as
intermediaries between shippers and individual subcontractors.
We assumed that shippers would construct supply chains so we
could evaluate 3PL providers by their searching (or intermediaries)
and abilities. If shippers can select an appropriate 3PL provider, theytion.
5 The relationship between experience and searching ability might not be
independent.
Fig. 1. Content analysis framework.
Source: Marasco [7].
26 K. Tezuka / IATSS Research 35 (2011) 24–29can improve the total efﬁciency of the integrated supply chain. In
other words high ability 3PL providers contribute to the construction
of generally more efﬁcient supply chain processes. Nemoto and
Tezuka [1] describe the conceptual relationships between 3PL and
SCM (Fig. 2).4. Principal–agent relationships
3PL providers are basically integrated, contract-based logistics
providers. The relationship between shippers and 3PL providers can
be viewed as a principal–agent relationship. We usually describe
those who delegate tasks as “principals” and those to whom they are
delegated are “agents.” In this case, shippers are “principals” and 3PL
providers are “agents.”
In the principal–agent theory of economics, desirable types of
contract would depend on conditions such as ease of monitoring and
performance evaluation, the attitudes toward risk of each participant,
and so on. In addition, as seen in Fig. 2, 3PL providers have many
trading relationships in their horizontal/vertical processes. Compared
to integrated providers, they have intricate webs of relationship that



















Fig. 2. Two kind of SCM/3PL alliance.
Source: Nemoto and Tezuka [1].The ﬁrst reason is to spread risk by outsourcing logistics tasks. For
example, as Nemoto, Tezuka and Futamura [2] suggest, shippers can
avoid taking on some risks by delegating some operations and
investments to 3PL providers, especially when they are trying to enter
new and as-yet-unknown markets. It seems that asset-type 3PL
providers assume more risk than non-asset type 3PL or 4PL providers.
The second reason, as mentioned above, is that 3PL providers are
expected to bring beneﬁts by exercising their specialized abilities in
areas such as searching or coordination. If the beneﬁts of 3PL providers
can be sharedwith shippers, it is advantageous for shippers tooutsource
their logistics activity. The shippers' gain from using 3PL providers will
depend on such abilities. From the shipper's perspective, it is important
to select a 3PL provider with the right specialized abilities.
Regarding the latter point, the beneﬁt of utilizing specialized 3PL
providers can be related to the concept of agency efﬁciency. If agency
efﬁciency can be appropriately exercised by 3PL providers, the total
economic cost of supply chain processes can beminimized, or net value
maximized. Here, total economic cost also includes transaction costs,
the cost of coordination among supply chain ﬁrms, etc. Conversely,
obtaining greater gains through the utilization of 3PL/4PL providers
requires a relationship of high agency efﬁciency between them.We also
see these points applied to cases of Japanese ﬁrms entering the Chinese
market in Nemoto, Tezuka and Futamura [2].5. The importance of 3PL provider selection
3PL provider selection is important for shippers to enhance agency
efﬁciency. Roughly speaking, there are two types of selection: open
competition and closed selection. Open competitive selection has
some advantages over closed selection.
The advantages of using open competitive selection are obtained
because many agents participate in open selection, competing among
themselves. This is different from normal competition in which each
agent provides services in a certain market. Rather, each provider
offers service content to the shipper (client) in franchise bidding. That
is sometimes called “competition for the market6” whereas normal
market competition is called “competition in the market.”
There are two advantages when “competition for the market”
occurs. First, each bid participant has incentives to offer cost reductions6 See Williamson [9].
27K. Tezuka / IATSS Research 35 (2011) 24–29or beneﬁcial services. Second, the process of competition offers the
possibility that a superior 3PL provider with innovative activity may
emerge.
However, the closed model is frequently employed, particularly in
the Japanese context, because open competition invites the following
problems. First, using open competition means that shippers must
assume the risk that stems from outsourcing to an as-yet-unknown
3PL provider. When an unknown 3PL provider is selected, the
character of the provider may not be clear to shippers. In other
words, the problem of asymmetric information between shippers and
3PL providers might arise. Outsourcing overall logistics activities to a
3PL provider may have a great impact on the earnings of the shipper.
Losses due to failure by a 3PL provider selection could be great.
With respect to the risk caused by asymmetric information
between 3PL providers and shippers, Nemoto, Visser and Yoshimoto
[10] noted that when shippers choose freight transport companies
through open auctions using the Internet, there may be a high risk of
low-quality service. True, transportation costs may be reduced
through the use of Internet open auctions. But it is sometimes
observed that the risk of lower quality overwhelms the cost savings
from the using open selection. Selection through the Internet can be
said to have the highest level of openness to the public. Shippers,
therefore, may face a comparatively high risk of an as-yet-unknown
partner and asymmetric information. It is necessary to get to know the
other party well in a competition open to the public to decrease this
risk, and careful selection is required.
Second, the problem of the “winner's curse” is also raised in severe
competitive auctions or in uncertain circumstances.7 The winner's
curse is a situation in which the highest and the most optimistic
bidder wins the bid, but ultimately takes a loss. It is sometimes
suggested that one factor in failures of 3PL sourcing is “over promising
and under-delivering,”which can be interpreted as a kind of winner's
curse. Kodaira [12], a 3PL practitioner, stated that “I frequently
observed that Japanese 3PL providers (freighters) undertook opera-
tions with negative earnings. However it was difﬁcult for the provider
to continue to operate under those conditions and ﬁnally their
contracts were canceled.” In sum, such cases of the winner's curse can
easily be found in open competition selections, especially in Japan.
Third, many participants are expected to tender in the open
selection of 3PL providers. Transaction costs, therefore, rise as the
number of bidders increases. Selecting a 3PL provider requires a
multi-index evaluation including estimated cost, service quality and
so on, making the work of selection more difﬁcult than the standard
single-index auction that compares cost. Some papers reinforce this
point. For example, Vaidyanathan [13] provided criteria for evaluating
3PL providers. He employed six factors such as IT, quality, cost,
service, performance metrics, and intangibles, and found that the role
of IT is important when shippers utilize 3PL providers.
In addition, an open auctionmight sometimes disclose information
important to the shipper's ﬁrm. Such disclosure might generate risks
for shippers. Indeed, non-disclosure contracts are often required at
the selection stage.
As stated above, in selecting 3PL providers shippers are also
required to evaluate 3PL providers' abilities. If a shipper does not have
the ability to evaluate 3PL providers, it may need to retain consultants
to make the selection. This means additional transaction costs are
required.
As a result, while the beneﬁts of agency efﬁciency increase through
the open competitive selection of 3PL providers, transaction costs also
increase. Therefore, choosing the method of 3PL provider selection
(open or closed) requires considering such trade-offs and any other
inﬂuential factors.7 See Thaler [11].6. Incomplete contracts and “hold-up” problems associated with
the use of 3PL providers
Other problems associated with using 3PL providers include the
manner of contracting between shippers and 3PL providers. William-
son [14] reviewed the role of outsourcing in SCM from a transaction
cost economics perspective. Contract theory has been developed
recently in connection with transaction economics. As mentioned
above, 3PL is also called “contract logistics,” and contract performance
is important for both parties. Although 3PL providers may be capable
of conducting their business, they may be unable to provide service at
desirable levels due to the problem of contract incompleteness.
Removing such difﬁculties requires specifying ex-ante agreements in
detail, which implies that contracts should bewritten as completely as
possible to avoid “hold-up” problems stemming from incomplete
contracts. We will explain the problem in detail below.
3PL providers undertake logistical multi-tasking and sometimes
further outsource to subcontractors in the supply chain. They have a
“nexus of contracts” in the supply chain. The relationship among
stakeholders when utilizing 3PL providers becomes more complex
than when shippers conduct logistics activities by themselves (in-
house operation) or when shippers simply outsource each task such
as transportation or warehouse operation individually. In short,
transaction costs are higher when using 3PL than for either in-
house or individual outsourcing. When shippers outsource business,
the beneﬁts should exceed the costs. To offer the beneﬁt of using
them, as mentioned above, 3PL providers must demonstrate special-
ized abilities. Doing so requires appropriate risk (and gain) sharing
between shippers and 3PL providers.
Specialization that takes advantage of 3PL utilization stems from
assets. Such assets include not only tangible one like ﬂeets,
warehouses, and logistics facilities but also intangible one like the
accumulated knowledge of each ﬁrm. The beneﬁt by using 3PL will
depend on how well these assets are managed. Obtaining the beneﬁt
of such assets requires appropriate incentives. If a 3PL provider and a
shipper can sign a contract with desirable incentivemechanisms, both
parties gain in a so called “win–win” relationship. However, it is not
easy to design contracts with such compatible incentives. The more
complicated tasks and relationships that emerge when utilizing 3PL
make signing an appropriate contact particularly difﬁcult.
The contract theory in economics states the problem of incomplete
contracts. If the contract between a shipper and a 3PL provider is
incomplete, it creates additional costs. In the case of contract
incompleteness, each party can observe but cannot verify. This un-
veriﬁability means each party has an incentive to behave opportu-
nistically with regard to irreversible investment. That is, if a party such
as a 3PL provider conducts ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment (investment that
is irreversible and cannot be diverted to other usages), it faces the risk
of opportunistic behavior.
If the 3PL provider has invested in (constructed) logistics facilities
for a speciﬁc shipper that cannot be easily diverted to the use of other
shippers, the shipper might have an incentive to negotiate, for
example, a price reduction with the 3PL provider after construction of
the facilities. Such a renegotiation is “opportunistic” behavior by the
shipper. It costs the 3PL provider to cancel investment because the
assets are irreversible and ﬁrm speciﬁc. Conversely, the 3PL provider
has fewer incentives to invest in such ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets. This is the
so-called “hold-up problem.”
The main reason that the hold-up problem occurs is incomplete
contracts. If the contract between the shipper and 3PL provider is
complete, the behavior of both parties can be veriﬁed by outside third
parties to avoid opportunistic behavior. Difﬁculty in writing a
complete contract creates an increased risk of hold-up problems.
In general, under circumstances where hold-up problems could
arise, each party has less incentive to invest in speciﬁc assets, even
















Fig. 3. Relationship between assets and inputs.
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investment can be desirable for both parties, under-investment may
still occur. For example, under an incomplete contract, a 3PL provider
might construct logistics facilities such as warehouses not to meet the
speciﬁc needs of client-shippers but rather to have broad utility in the
event of contract cancelation. This situation impedes the achievement
of win–win outcomes through the use of 3PL. If so, what conditions
are required so that each party can avoid hold-up and under-
investment problems?
7. Who should own assets?
In considering the ownership problem, we apply the model from
Hart [15] to a 3PL contract. There are two players: shipper and 3PL
provider. Each player has ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets8: AS for those of the
shipper and AL for those of the 3PL provider. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets
create additional value if each asset is owned by each player. That is, a
shipper using asset AS with input i units generates added value (such
as proﬁt) of R(i). In contrast, cost savings of C(e) are obtained if the
3PL provider utilizes asset AL with input e units. It is assumed that
levels of input i and e can be observed but not veriﬁed. These inputs
are assumed to involve additional costs. Then, as mentioned above,
under an incomplete contract, levels of input by each player are
smaller than the optimal/most efﬁcient levels because of the hold-up
problem (Fig. 3).
Hart [15] addressed the issue of who should own assets in various
situations. If each input is independent of the overall beneﬁt—that is, if
there is no additional gain from one player utilizing the other's asset
(e.g. the shipper uses AL or the 3PL provider uses AS)—then each
player should have their own asset. Conversely, if each input is
interdependent and assets are complementary – meaning both are
required to get additional gain – one player should have the two
assets AS and AL together. In the latter case, integrated in-house
operation by the shipper is preferred.
If the two assets are strictly complementary, and if one party's
input is inelastic and the other's is elastic,9 then the latter party whose
input is elastic should have both assets at a time. If input by a 3PL
provider is elastic and its input can affect overall proﬁt, it is preferable
that logistics activity-related assets are owned by the 3PL provider,
whichmight be the rationale for asset-type 3PL providers. In addition,
as far as physical assets are considered, if AS and AL can be regarded as
common assets, then joint ownership by both players with the power
of veto would be preferable in the sense of enhancing total beneﬁt
under some conditions. This suggests that joint ownership of logistics
facilities by shippers and 3PL providers can be meaningful.
The problem of the trade-off between asset speciﬁcity and 3PL
performance has been considered by Aertsen [16], and it seems we
can determine the more desirable types of ownership by using the
above framework and soon see the applicability of contract theory to
3PL. Although these suggestions above are only a fraction of the
application of the theory, that has much room for application to 3PL in
the supply chain.
8. Environmental concerns and the utilization of 3PL
Generally speaking, there has been rapid growth in the attention
directed toward environmental burden, and it is now important to
consider environmental issues. Therefore, we brieﬂy consider the
relationship between environmental issues and 3PL in SCM.
From an economic viewpoint, some environmental issues can be
attributed to the “externality” problem. Themain issues pertaining to the8 Note that “asset” in this case denotes things that create value (beneﬁt).
9 The term “elastic” means that the outcome could change depending on input and
“inelastic” is vice versa.environment, sustainability and externality in a logistics context are
considered to be freight transport CO2 or local pollution. Utilizing 3PL
providers may sometimes reduce environmental cost through more
efﬁcient operations (of vehicles, for example).However, themainpurpose
of companies such as shippers and 3PL providers is to reduce costs or
secure proﬁts, which may not coincide with environmental concerns.
Therefore governmental policies ormarket interventionsmaybe required
to attain environmental friendly outcomes.
However, efforts to conduct business in an environmental manner
have also been growing rapidly. Environmentally friendly logistics
concepts such as green logistics and reverse logistics have been catching
on. A case may therefore be made that private companies have an
incentive to respond voluntarily to environmental issues. “ISO14001”
certiﬁcation is one example. Each ﬁrm has an incentive to acquire it to
enhance the reputation andmarket value of the ﬁrm. Indeed, the number
of shipping companies that address environmental issues in their CSR
(Corporate Social Responsibility) activities is increasing.
Regarding certiﬁcation such as ISO14001, the Foundation for
Promoting Personal Mobility and Ecological Transportation in Japan
began a certiﬁcation program for Green Management (business opera-
tions with low environmental load) in the trucking business on October
2003. Some 3PL providers have such certiﬁcations and promote
themselves to shippers as environmental friendly companies. For shippers
that are interested in environmental issues, certiﬁcation seems to be an
important factor in the selection of a 3PL provider.
While environmental concerns have been growing rapidly, with
regard to the relationship between 3PL and reverse logistics, Wolf and
Seuring [17] pointed out that 3PL utilization decisions are still made
on traditional performance criteria despite the increasing interest in
environmental issues by shippers. They insist, therefore, that, when it
comes to selecting a 3PL provider, shippers should take environmen-
tal criteria into account and manage environmental impact jointly
with the selected 3PL provider. Mukhopadhyay and Setaputra [5]
stated that utilization by 3PL/4PL providers of reverse logistics
processes has been growing. However the concept has not taken
root yet. They also use economic models and numerical examples to
show the role of 4PL as a logistics integrator. Similar to other
countries, Japanese companies tend to be more conscious of
environmental issues these days, which makes shippers' companies
utilize 3PL within sustainable environmental constraints.9. Concluding remarks
In this paper we ﬁrst proposed a conceptual framework for
evaluating 3PL utilization in SCM, where we assumed that shippers
could enjoy advantages derived from four contributory sources of 3PL
specialization: scale, know-how, searching ability and/or IT skills. It
29K. Tezuka / IATSS Research 35 (2011) 24–29was also supposed that shippers could beneﬁt from 3PL particularly
when facing uncertain business environments.
We also applied principal–agent relationships to shippers and 3PL
providers. Further, we saw that enhancing agency efﬁciency is
important to obtaining beneﬁts from utilizing 3PL. We also looked at
issues such as the role of 3PL provider selection, the hold-up problem
under incomplete contracts, and asset ownership. These are the main
points that we considered regarding 3PL utilization.
Themain contribution of this study is to try to apply arguments from
recent economic theories, such as contract theory, to the context of 3PL
utilization in SCM. However, we apply only a small part of models and
theories, such as contracts theory, andmuch remains to be addressed by
future research. The paper employs a conceptually based approach and
we discuss some points using existing economic models. Therefore, it
will be necessary to examine the usefulness of these points through
quantitative or qualitative analysis. In addition, we need to consider the
relationship between environmental concerns and the utilization of 3PL
in more detail. In fact, there are many cases of 3PL utilization in Japan
and internationally to be addressed in future research.
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